

WIDENER



HN 7IAG 5

REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO (LEOPOLDVILLE)

THE PROVINCE OF THE KATANGA AND CONGOLESE INDEPENDENCE



DOCUMENT DIVISION
OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

NUMBER 1

JANUARY, 1962

08643

HARVARD UNIVERSITY
WIDENER LIBRARY

2324

To bring to fruition the action undertaken to terminate the secession of the Katanga, the Government needs the collaboration of the entire population of the country. The Government wishes to safeguard our Congolese heritage and let every Congolese share in the nation's inheritance. In the action which the Government is undertaking to end the Katangan secession, there is full agreement between the Government and myself. That is why I am taking this occasion to make a solemn renewal of my complete confidence in the Government and to assure it of my wholehearted support.

Joseph Kasavubu

PART I

GENERAL DESCRIPTION

Of the territories which constituted the former Belgian Congo, the Province of Katanga has always posed a special problem.

A "geological monstrosity" for the scientists, an inexhaustible source of riches for financiers and colonizers, the Katanga remains even today the most sought after of all the Congolese territories, the object of foreign manipulations, the prey of every would-be exploiter.

So many of those who proclaim themselves to be the true friends of the Congolese people began to show their true colors with the turn of events in the Katanga; it is no longer possible for the inhabitants of this country to regard these people without bitterness.

Just as it is true that the Katanga has always been the central preoccupation of the responsible authorities of this country, today it is as well the center of political interest in Africa and in the world; tomorrow, perhaps, it may be one of the world's great battlefields because certain powers who, taking advantage of the weakness of certain people, would like to take all the riches of the entire earth for their own sole profit.

*
* * *

A country of contrasts and extremes, the Katanga was, as of June 30, 1960, the least populated of the Congolese provinces.

With its 1,654,000 inhabitants, Katanga had only one-eighth of the population of the Congo. Its density of 5.6 inhabitants to the square mile was much less than that of the other provinces. On the other hand, the European population was by far the most numerous of any province, and amounted to more than one-fifth of the total European population of the Congo.

Although the immense riches of this province lay in an almost deserted area at the time of the European scramble for Africa, it was precisely the discovery of these riches which brought about the influx of neighboring peoples and attracted above all the Europeans and their investments.

With the discovery of the enormous mineral deposits in 1892, Belgian explorers signed treaties with native chiefs who surrendered their authority to the independent state.

On May 12, 1894 the Katangan border was recognized by the English. It embraced the watershed of the Congo and the Zambezi Rivers.

In 1891 the Katanga Company was formed. Its objective was to finance expeditions which would survey the country and conclude treaties with local chiefs. In exchange for the company's collaboration, King Leopold II awarded it exploitation rights in certain territories, but the delineation of these territories ran into such difficulties that, by common consent, the independent state and the company decided to entrust to the "Special Committee of the Katanga", created on June 2, 1900, the task of surveying the wealth of this vast, hardly explored region. The profits resulting from exploration were to be shared at the rate of two-thirds for the State and one-third for the Katanga Company.

Next, in order to avoid British rapaciousness, the Special Committee of the Katanga decided to grant to a British company, the Tanganyikan Concessions, Ltd., the right to prospect the regions of southern Katanga.

These then were the entities which, on October 28, 1906, formed the Union Minière du Haut Katanga. The Union Minière du Haut Katanga brought in as its capital investment the mineral-rich properties it owned, Tanganyika Concessions offered to provide research and technicians as its share, and ready money was made available by the Société Générale de Belgique and by private subscribers.

Today the capital of UMHK amounts to some eight billion francs, represented by 1,242,000 shares. Of these shares:

179,760 14 1/2%
Belong to the Tanganyikan concessions

315,675 25.1%
Belong to the Special Committee of the Katanga,
of which 2/3 or 210,450 shares belong to the
Republic of the Congo.

18,500 or 1.5%
Belong entirely to the Company of the Katanga
(in addition to its share in the Special Committee).

57,685 or 4.5%
Belong to the Société Générale de Belgique.

The remaining shares are distributed among a large number of portfolios held by financial groups and private investors.

UMHK is the world's third most important producer of copper and the principal producer of cobalt. It also mines uranium. Besides the extraction of ores, the Society also engages in metallurgy of copper, cobalt, and other metals associated with copper.

UMHK also controls numerous companies in the Province.

In 1959 its annual profit was over 3 1/2 billion Belgian francs.

In export duties alone, the UMHK brought 1,250 million francs into the Congolese treasury. If one adds to that the revenue due the treasury from sources such as charges, taxes and imposts, a sum total of 2,983 million francs would come into the Congolese treasury as a result of the activities of UMHK this year.

The foregoing makes comprehensible the very great interest, and, unfortunately, the extremely active and continuing role which certain Western financial powers, primarily Belgian and British, have taken in the history of the Province of the Katanga.

It is no exaggeration to say that, either directly or in fear of dangerous rivals, the large segments of international capitalism -- and, consequently, all the enemies of capitalism as well -- have been interested in the future of this region.

Thus one can understand why, even before the proclamation of Congolese independence, certain political organizations in the Katanga were influenced to take a dangerous and clearly anti-patriotic position.

PART II
THE POLITICAL EVOLUTION
OF THE
KATANGA BEFORE INDEPENDENCE

A retarded political awakening

A bastion of Belgian paternalism in the Congo, the Katanga had a political awakening as abrupt as it was retarded. It went without any transition from the euphoria of a "pax Belgica" maintained without faltering for almost fifty years to the birth of a new situation the recognition of which has been obstinately ignored.

Greediness was evidenced the day the Katanga emerged from the protection of the colonial womb and preferred every kind of folly, even suicide, to becoming generous and altruistic.

Political events in the Katanga even in the period prior to independence give a tragic illustration of this truth.

Actually, the Africans of the Katanga were not among the first calling for Congolese independence.

When the events of January 4 erupted in Leopoldville, calm continued to reign in the copper province.

A marvel of organization and technical achievement, a giant organism with regular and precise movements similar to a natural phenomenon to which man's patient labor is almost incidental, UMHK regarded with indifference the first political somersaults of the Congo as they came, exhausted themselves and died. UMHK scarcely believed that they had any importance.

The reactions of the Belgian government to demands for independence and the latter's determination to grant the Congo independence, made UMHK anxious.

For a long time an antagonism had existed between Elisabethville, the "copper capital," and Leopoldville, the "business capital." The Province of the Katanga contributed all by itself nearly fifty per cent of the total income for the Congo budget. On the other hand, the Katanga received only some twenty per cent of the allocations of the budget for the entire Congo. In other words, the Katanga furnished the Government nearly one-third of the budget of the former colony. This put the Europeans living in the Province in a powerful position which they were determined to maintain.

The Africans of the Katanga, the victims of colonial paternalism, did not seem to understand that there could exist in the world any other policy but that of maintaining order at any price.

Subsequent events, demonstrated, however, that not all of them had the same concept of what constituted order.

THE ORIGINS OF CONAKAT

For the communal elections of 1957, no political parties existed yet in Elisabethville. The people of Kasai, because of their tribal unity, won most of the posts.

Stimulated by these election results, Katangans eventually formed on October 4, 1958 a confederation of the tribal associations of the Katanga. This was destined to become the celebrated Conakat.

Since its origin, Conakat has benefited from the support of certain Europeans in the Katanga who represent the worst kind of colonialism. Mr. Gavage, Head of the Katangan Union, a party composed of Europeans favorable to a "Belgian-Katangan community," and chief lobbyist for the policy of massive immigration to the area by whites, publicly supported Conakat.

The leadership of Conakat unabashedly accepted their support. Even at this time their ambition and their Machiavellian and unscrupulous behavior were demonstrated.

Even if it were true that the leaders of Conakat looked with some suspicion upon the efforts to populate the Province with Europeans, did they at least believe themselves sufficiently strong to be able to look out for themselves, to satisfy their own greedy desires?

This was certainly one of their gravest and most irreparable errors.

These same leaders of Conakat tried from the beginning to unite most of the tribal organizations existing in the Katanga; in fact, they could not hide their true objectives which were to dominate the entire province, ignoring the bonds which existed between them and all their Congolese brothers.

Other regions of the Katanga were not duped by this game. They understood that the adventure into which the Conakat leaders wished to lead them was contrary not only to their own interests, but above all, contrary to the higher interests of the Congolese nation. Having the vision and loyalty to avoid involvement in this adventure, Balubakat, a party composed of the Baluba of the Katanga under the leadership of Jason Sendwe, one of the vice presidents of the present government, withdrew from Conakat. Disowned from then on in the heart of the Province, but powerfully protected by certain foreign interests, Conakat pursued all alone, its mad and fatal policy.

THE FIRST POSITIONS TAKEN

The first ill-starred omens were not long in becoming apparent.

As early as May 26, 1959, in a policy statement published in L'Essor du Congo, an Elisabethville daily newspaper, Conakat made the following declaration: "The Katanga is opting for an autonomous and federal state in which the reins of political authority would be in the hands of the Katangans themselves and in the hands of all men of good will who have shown and are showing by their acts that they are collaborating sincerely with them for progress and rapid emancipation of the Katanga, in accordance with conditions which will be determined by the future government of the Katangan State."

It could be deduced from the same policy statement that Conakat was claiming to be the only party which could represent the so-called "Katangan people" and that all the other groupings, principally composed of people of the Kasai, should be considered as foreign elements.

In the face of this presumption and the overwhelming arrogance of Conakat, these groupings in December 1959 were forced to set up a cartel, comprised of Balubakat, Fedeka and Atcar. The Balubakat, whose president was Jason Sendwe, represented the Baluba of the Katanga. Fedeka, whose president was Isaac Kalonji, attempted to bring together all of the Kasaians residing in the Katanga; however, the tribal warfare which brought bloodshed to Luluabourg had as its

consequence the disassociation of the Lulua from Fedeka, and from that time on, Fedeka was composed of Baluba from the Kasai only. As for Atcar, led by Ambroise Muhunga, it was actually the social and cultural organization of the Chokwe of the Congo.

The struggle between Conakat and the cartel dominated all political activity in the Province of the Katanga in the months prior to independence.

FIRST ATTEMPT AT SECESSION

As time passed, Conakat continued to enhance its greedy and unpatriotic ambitions. In December, 1959, on the occasion of King Baudoin's visit to Elisabethville, a plot to bring about the secession of the Katanga only just escaped fulfillment.

CONAKAT AT THE BRUSSELS ROUND TABLE CONFERENCE

In January, 1960, at the time of the Brussels Round Table Conference, the delegates of Conakat revealed at last, to the greatest indignation of Congolese patriots gathered there, their real ambitions. They proposed, in effect, the creation of a federal Congolese state freely associated with Belgium in a Belgo-Congolese commonwealth founded on the equality of the people who composed it. The very singular terms of this proposition left no room for illusion: The federal state was equivalent, in fact, to a confederation, since each federated state would have the right to choose whether or not it wished to belong to the "Belgo-Congolese Commonwealth." Furthermore, this unacceptable proposition was accompanied by continual blackmail by the leaders of Conakat, who, in Elisabethville as in Brussels, never ceased threatening immediate secession if their proposals were not accepted.

Once again, Balubakat set the record straight; denounce the separatist and xenophobic tendencies of Conakat, and stated that far from having the approval of all of the Congolese in the Katanga, such a position would only raise their doubts about the Katanga's future.

CONAKAT AND THE RHODESIAN FEDERATION

A few weeks later, in early March, a new incident occurred. In a statement to the Daily Express, Sir Roy Welensky, Premier of

the Rhodesia-Nyasaland Federation, revealed that it had been suggested to him that the Katanga be incorporated in the Rhodesian Federation.

Conakat's reaction to this statement deserves to be published in full because it significantly reveals the aberration of its leaders:

"In a dispatch dated March 5, these leaders declared that Conakat was indignant because of rumors that certain parties were toying with the idea of an eventual union of the Katanga and the Rhodesian Federation. Conakat categorically rejects any idea of this sort. Conakat will employ all its forces to maintain the integrity of the territory within a framework of complete political, economic and administrative independence. Conakat will energetically oppose all Katangan partisans of such an idea, if indeed it really exists, because it knows how incompatible this idea is with its own thinking and its dignity, especially in view of the racial segregation that still exists in the Rhodesias and in the Union of South Africa."

These pious statements will no doubt evince a smile from all who know the extent to which Conakat's leaders, in order to achieve their infamous desires, have since requested support and aid from the Rhodesians and South Africans.

Everyone knows that it was to the worst enemies of Africa and the black man that these famous defenders of African dignity turned for help in their hour of trouble.

THE PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS OF MAY 1960

The results of the provincial elections of May, 1960 did not help clarify the prevailing situation: Out of the sixty seats contested, Conakat won forty-five and the Cartel twenty-three. Meanwhile, in Elisabethville, Conakat captured three seats with its 8,617 votes; however, its opponent, the Cartel, won only two seats with its 8,610 votes, that is, seven votes less than Conakat.

Furthermore, the Cartel complained of irregularities committed by the Belgian administration in the organization and the control of the elections. In several places the administrators of the territory had taken an open stand in favor of Conakat. At Kamina, Mr. Sendwe was barred

from any contact with the people at the tribal centers and incidents caused a number of victims among the partisans of the Cartel in the area. The results of the election when they were published in Elisabethville were formally contested by Mr. Sendwe who addressed a letter of protest to the Belgian Government and demanded the appointment of a committee of inquiry.

The Belgian authorities themselves admitted that there were frauds at the polls, but pressed by insufficient time because of the nearness of the fateful day of June 30, these authorities did not have the courage to call for new elections but rather hoped for the best.

In spite of all the difficulties created by the colonial power, the Cartel refused to admit defeat, since Conakat, although it constituted a minority, fully intended to take advantage of its victory. A very confusing situation ensued, and many distressing episodes occurred which, to the great embarrassment of the authorities, would continue to the eve of independence.

The duplicity or, at least the equivocation, of this Belgian policy were exposed at last. Corruption was rampant, business circles had definitely decided to play all sides at the same time to make sure of not losing anything, and the administration was internally divided with sharp differences of opinion between the administration in Leopoldville and Elisabethville.

CONAKAT SEEKS REVISION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW

The unreasonable position of Conakat reached its climax with the revision of the law of May 19, 1960 on the structure of the Nation.

In order to protest against the injustice directed against them, the leaders of the Cartel decided not to appear at the Provincial Assembly, thus preventing the organization of a Provincial Government. Even though Conakat could hope to obtain a simple majority because of the alliances it had engineered through intrigue and pay-offs, a majority which would permit the creation of a government of Conakat's choosing, it was at the same time impossible for Conakat to get the necessary two-thirds majority required by Article 114 of the Fundamental Law for the election of a Provincial Government.

In view of these restraining conditions, Conakat sought an amendment of Articles 110 and 114 of the Fundamental Law so that it could elect a Government with a simple majority of votes.

THE MISTAKES OF BELGIAN POLICY

This was a very delicate question for the Belgian Government since it could not abstain nor could it act without appearing biased on one side or another. Sharp differences of opinion arose and pressures of all kinds were exerted.

The political committee of the Minister of the Congo in Brussels, aware of its duty toward the Congo, categorically rejected the proposed amendment.

The Belgian Minister, De Schryver, assumed the heavy responsibility of bypassing the advice of the committee and put the proposed amendment before Parliament.

In fact, he yielded to pressure applied by Belgian business circles and by the Katanga Provincial Administration, but, most important of all, he gave in to the despicable blackmail exerted by Conakat which did nothing to mask its determination to safeguard its victory at all costs.

On the other hand, the Parliamentary Commission grudgingly gave in on the proposed amendments. It was aware of the dictatorial ambitions of Moise Tshombe and feared the transformation of Conakat into a single party. The Commission therefore, demanded from Conakat a formal promise to guarantee proportional representation in the appointments for ministers and senators.

Since the text of the Fundamental Law called for the enforcement of this rule, this demand on the part of the Parliamentary Committee was in fact an expression of anxiety at Conakat's readiness to take the road of illegality.

Once more defiant of Belgian authority, and devoid of any shame, Conakat again revived the spectre of secession.

Vice-Governor General Schoeller, whose role throughout this period was more than dubious, believed that he would be able to exact commitments (on whose behalf, it must be asked) that proportional representation would be respected.

Confusion was rampant; certain parties took pleasure in encouraging it. The Belgian Government only hesitated. More pressures were applied.

On June 12, as the Cartel persisted in the legitimate defense of its rights, Conakat threw caution to the winds. Mr. Kibwe spoke of entering into negotiations with "The Confederation of Northern Rhodesia" (sic); Mr. Tshombe threatened to appeal to the United Nations and to secede on June 14.

On this date Vice-Governor Schoeller set events in motion. In Elisabethville a state of emergency was proclaimed. In Brussels he guaranteed that the Cartel would have four ministers even if it boycotted the Assembly on the day of the vote. The Belgian Parliament seized the opportunity offered it and on June 15 approved the amendments.

The Conakat minority set up a one-party government. At that moment the bad faith and the false intentions of Conakat were unquestionably exposed. When Conakat, by clever maneuverings, obtained a complete victory, it made two decisions of unbelievable shamelessness. On Thursday, June 16 in the course of electing the Provincial Government in the absence of the delegates of the Cartel, the Provincial Assembly elected a government composed only of Conakat. It shamelessly rejected all the previous commitments that Vice-Governor Schoeller had so zealously pledged.

SECOND ATTEMPT AT SECESSION

Finally, at the end of June, 1960, a few days before independence, displeased by the attitude toward it taken by Mr. Lumumba's government, Conakat tried for the second time to put into execution its plans for an immediate proclamation of independence and secession of the Province.

On June 25, 1960, Mr. Frans Scheerlink, a Belgian businessman, was named Ambassador of the State of Katanga. His mission was to announce on June 28 to King Baudoin and to Prime Minister Eyskens the independence of the Province and then to depart for New York to defend the cause of Katangan independence before the United Nations.

The following document is so unbelievable that the reader may wonder if he is dreaming:

State of Katanga
Office of the President of the Council

Elisabethville
June 25, 1960

Mr. Frans Scheerlink
Elisabethville

Mr. Ambassador,

I have the honor to inform you that with the approval of the Council of Ministers of the State of Katanga, I appoint you Special Ambassador, in charge of a mission in behalf of the Government of Katanga.

You will receive in a special dispatch from my office the documents providing you with credentials and also all the necessary instructions for the performance of the missions that are entrusted to you on behalf of the Government of the State of Katanga.

The decree officially bestowing upon you the post of Ambassador will be effective as of June 30, 1960, immediately after the transfer of power from Belgium to the legally constituted Government of the State of Katanga.

Please, Mr. Ambassador, receive the assurance of my highest esteem.

The Minister of Interior (Signed)
Munongo Godefro;

The President of the Council of
Ministers of the State of Katanga
(signed)
Moise Tshombe

Despite its weakness, the Belgian Government could not remain indifferent to such a betrayal.

Mr. Scheerlink was ousted as undesirable. The leaders of Conakat on June 26 agreed formally not to resort to secession on condition that Mr. Scheerlink would not be arrested either in Leopoldville or in Brussels.

Questioned on June 27 by the Security Service in Leopoldville, Mr. Scheerlink revealed some interesting facts that throw light upon the then prevailing mood of the Conakat leaders:

Q. Do you think that in spite of the prudence counselled by Vice-Governor Schoeller to the Conakat representatives, they still have the intention of proclaiming Katangan independence?

A. I'm afraid that they will persevere in their intentions, because they are guided either by fear of the Lumumba peril or of the Communist peril.

Q. Who is seeking the secession of Katanga?

A. The intention to secede was voiced by the members of the Provincial Government who were present at the meeting. This is a reaction to the Lumumba peril and an expression of their desire to separate Katanga from the rest of the Congo. On the other hand, this reaction is connected with a desire to stay attached to Belgium, and to effect an economic alliance with it. It also envisages the maintenance of the Kamina base which is threatened by Lumumba who is seeking its dismantling.

Q. How does the Provincial Government foresee the realization of their desire to secede?

A. In summary, the secession would be effected and realized by a proclamation of the Provincial Government asking for the recognition by Belgium and the United States of the independence of Katanga. Recognition, furthermore, would be asked of nations such as Great Britain and Portugal, and neighboring powers. Simultaneously it would launch an appeal to the U. N.

These few statements are in themselves eloquent enough and require no comment.

KATANGA ON THE EVE OF INDEPENDENCE

This was the situation in Katanga on June 30, 1960.

In shows clearly the guilty intentions of the Conakat leaders and also their direct responsibility for the abnormal political situation prevailing in Katanga on the eve of independence.

Of course, foreign elements also bear a heavy responsibility for the shape of events. Certain elements in the Belgian colony and certain financial circles shamelessly exploited the limitless ambition of the Conakat leaders.

As for the Belgian Government, its sins seemed to lie more in weakness than in bad intentions -- and it must be blamed, above all, for its lack of firmness and unified action in enforcing the generous policy that it had adopted toward the Congo.

Long before June 30, an atmosphere of unrest and confusion prevailed in the copper province. The events following independence would crystallize these tendencies and bring about the explosive crisis, the tragic consequences of which are still being experienced by our country.

PART III

THE KATANGAN SECESSION

The Crystallation of the Congolese Crisis

The proclamation of the independence of Katanga and the secession of the province constitute, from a political as well as legal point of view, the determinating and decisive factors of the Congolese crisis.

These factors have not always been acknowledged; the extensive program of propaganda, the chaos existing at that time, the multiplicity and seriousness of the problems which were created, all had their share in masking the relative importance of the events as well as their real meaning. It is sad to realize how many questions greatly affecting world peace, which were debated by the highest international bodies, were completely distorted, in their content as well as in their perspective, even before they were taken up for discussion by the international bodies.

The most fantastic allegations were disseminated. Enormous importance was given to questions of secondary concern and often the primary ones were lost from view.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CLIMATE IN THE CONGO ON JUNE 30, 1960

This is why it will be helpful to review the important events that characterized the first days of Congolese independence. Both Europeans and Congolese approached independence day in a state of mutual fear and distrust. Both groups were extremely anxious and this feeling was intensified by a fear on both sides of showing the slightest weakness.

Political independence was being granted by the Belgians to a country which they had not made any attempt to decolonize.

The Congolese were not sure that they held real power in their hands. The Belgians were not sure that they had sufficient influence to protect themselves and their legitimate interests.

This is the background to the tragedy. With a reservoir of individual good will on the political level as well as in other sectors of the country's activities, the Congo was engulfed in an atmosphere of folly and groundless fears.

The reactions were extreme. They created a difficult situation, but not a basically hopeless one.

Under such circumstances, a speech by King Baudoin or by Premier Lumumba could be badly misinterpreted. The same would have been true for a mutiny or a foreign military intervention.

Only an act of unmitigated treason, however, could make it impossible to arrive at a conciliatory solution and raise an unsurmountable barrier.

For this act of treason, the Provincial Government headed by Moise Tshombe and a handful of rapacious and irresponsible Europeans, must carry a heavy burden throughout history.

THE BELGIAN AGGRESSION IN THE CONGO

Enough has been said of the Belgian Aggression against the Congo. Enough has also been said of the Congolese xenophobia toward the Belgians.

As if it were not obvious that both had a common interest in the maintenance of law and order. As if it were not obvious that upon independence their interests were too closely knit to allow them to be separated.

To think that the Belgian government had the intention to reconquer the Congo militarily is as absurd as to believe that the Congolese government actually had the intention of bringing to a close a collaboration with the Belgians that was vitally important to the country.

Premier Lumumba was the first to try to suppress the mutinies in the Lower Congo knowing that the consequences would be harmful to his own government. The Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Wigny, as well as the Belgian Ambassador in Leopoldville, Mr. Bosch, spared no effort, at least until July 11, the date of the proclamation of the independence of Katanga, to prevent Belgian military intervention in the Congo from becoming other than an attempt to safeguard human lives, to assure that law and order would be re-established and enforced.

There has been enough argument over the issue of whether or not the Belgian troops intervened upon the request of the Congolese government.

Great publicity, especially in Belgium, was given to the statements in this respect by the Congolese Ministers, without taking into account that those statements could not in any circumstances become the legal basis for the intervention; actually, only the Minister of Defense, at that time Mr. Patrice Lumumba, had the authority, by virtue of the Belgian-Congolese General Treaty of Friendship, Assistance and Cooperation, to make an appeal for the military intervention of the Belgian troops.

It is true that this treaty has never been ratified by the Congolese Chambers, and groups favoring the thesis of Belgian aggression apparently have attached an undue importance to this fact. Furthermore, the Parliament has likewise not ratified the adherence of the Congo to the Charter of the United Nations which has not prevented the Congo from being a full member of the United Nations. Patrice Lumumba did not oppose in principle the presence of Belgian troops.

In fact, all these discussions become pointless in the face of the fait accompli of the presence of the Belgian troops in the Congo, and Premier Lumumba, aware of his responsibilities towards his country and toward a great number of Belgian settlers who were eventually to leave the country but who were still there, did not hesitate to give his approval to the presence of these troops as long as they conformed to certain basic rules and agreed to pursue mainly humanitarian tasks under the authority of the Congolese Government.

As a result of the tragic situation prevailing at the airport of Luluabourg, to which the Belgian settlers had rushed in full force to leave the Province for good, the Premier wrote to the Belgian Consul General on July 11, 1960 a letter that fully disclosed his real feelings:

Republic of the Congo
Office of the Prime Minister
Luluabourg, July 11, 1960

Mr. Consul General:

I have the honor of acknowledging the receipt of your letter of today's date.

I agree in principle that the Belgian metropolitan troops operating in Luluabourg can remain for at least two months in the Province of Kasai and on the conditions that you desire.

This agreement, however, should be confirmed in writing after you confirm to me the acceptance on the part of your government of the conditions that I imposed in the letter that I am forwarding to you today.

I reaffirm to you that it is the wish of my government to guarantee, by all the means at its disposal, the safety and protection of our Belgian friends with whom we wish to live in peace.

I regret, in the name of the government of our Republic, the inadmissible actions that some soldiers have perpetrated against Europeans living in this Province.

Our Minister of Justice, Mr. Mwamba, has today given formal instructions to the King's Prosecutor for legal inquests to be opened immediately regarding all guilty elements.

In expression of my sincere regard for all your countrymen, I beg you to accept, Mr. Consul General, the assurance of my highest esteem.

P. Lumumba
Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense of the Republic of the Congo

This letter is ample proof that Patrice Lumumba was not that unyielding xenophobe which certain elements have said he was, and that he had too much political flair not to understand that the maintenance of the Belgian presence was one of the most necessary conditions for the future development of the Congolese nation.

MOISE TSHOME'S TREASONABLE ACT

The insane attitude of Moise Tshombe and the evil machinations of certain unscrupulous Belgians would prevent, alas, the realization of this noble aspiration.

Actually, at the very time that Premier Lumumba was signing this generous letter at Luluabourg, Moise Tshombe was solumnly proclaiming the independence of the Katanga.

"Belgium has granted independence to the Congo. This was done according to the Belgian pledge of January 13, 1959. This pledge and the Royal message that accompanied it envisaged our establishing democratic institutions in accordance with the stipulations of the Charter of the United Nations -- which commits itself to respect the rights of self-determination for all peoples -- and which foresaw a regime that was not a servile facsimile of Western democratic institutions but one which the various regions forming the Congo would choose themselves according to their own conceptions, and embracing the traditions that they cherish.

The independence of the Congo is a fact since June 30, 1960.

What is the situation we see around us at present?

In all the Congo and particularly in Katanga and in the province of Leopoldville we see in operation tactics calculated to create disorder and terror... tactics that we have seen before applied repeatedly in many countries now under communist dictatorships.

In the aftermath of fraudulent elections in certain provinces that have given a majority to a single party, countless voters have been unable to cast their ballot -- and a central government with an extremist majority has been constituted. Immediately after this, the government, heedless of its limitations under the Fundamental Law, was attempting to involve itself in affairs that are exclusively under the jurisdiction of the provincial governments. It is thus that the Prime Minister of the Congo has appointed, by his sole authority, the state commissioners in several provinces. Only the intervention of the Senate succeeded in rendering this maneuver null and void.

Disorders broke out everywhere. This tactic of disorganization and fragmentation of authority has always been used by the propagandists and by the leaders of the Communist Party.

The result was immediately evident. Some of the soldiers, abandoning all discipline, began on July 5 to engage in acts of insubordination, threats, cruelty and abuse directed mainly against the European populations; these included unlawful searches and arrests, ransacking and murder.

The purpose of these maneuvers and the fact that they were premeditated was sufficiently unmasked by the repeated protests on the part of the Congolese Premier against the sending of Belgian troops to protect human lives and property.

We have noted for some time that the sole desire of the present Central Government is the disintegration of all the military and administrative machinery, the establishment of a regime of terror that will bring about the flight of our Belgian collaborators. It wishes by this method to replace their trained men as fast as possible with staff personnel which the Government has already recruited from countries under communist domination.

The Katanga cannot lend itself to actions of this kind. The government of the Katanga has been elected by a provincial assembly which itself was elected on the basis of a program of peace and order.

Under these circumstances, and in the face of the threats to our welfare that would thrust upon us our continued submission to the arbitrary and communist-inclined will of the Central Government, the government of the Katanga has decided to proclaim the independence of the Katanga.

This independence is complete. Meanwhile, fully aware of the imperative necessity of economic collaboration with Belgium, the Government of the Katanga, to which Belgium has just granted the support of its own troops in order to protect human lives, asks Belgium to unite with the Katanga in a close economic community.

It asks for the continuation of Belgian support -- technical, financial and military. It asks Belgium to help re-establish order and public safety.

If Belgium refuses to fulfill this obligation and if it refuses to recognize the Katanga as a free and independent nation, and its government as the only legal government, Katanga will appeal to the Free World and request from all the recognition of its right, which is that of all peoples, to self-determination.

If we turn to Belgium with our plea and with an appeal for economic collaboration, it is mainly in recognition of all the benefits that Belgium has brought us.

We ask all the inhabitants of the Katanga, with no distinction of race or color, to rally around us to guide our nation and all its people towards political, social and economic progress for the welfare of all.

We have firmly decided to receive with open arms all of those from other regions of the Congo who are willing to work with us in the same ideal of order, brotherhood and progress.

May God protect Independent Katanga."

THE ILLEGALITY OF MOISE TSHOMBE'S DECISION

It must be noted that in making this proclamation Mr. Tshombe placed himself in a position of total illegality. The Fundamental Law of May 19, 1960 foresaw explicitly, in Article 6, that "The Congo is within its present boundaries an indivisible and democratic state." In seceding and in wishing to establish a dictatorial government Mr. Tshombe was placing himself doubly into deliberate illegality. The maintenance of order was nothing but a pretext.

Thus both Moise Tshombe and the Conakat used the disorders of July to realize the long fostered and greedy ambition that they were cherishing for many months. Mr. Scheerlink was not mistaken in his statements.

In fact, on July 11, calm was restored in the Lower Congo, where the mutinies ended. Everything indicates that with the loyal cooperation of the Belgian troops, the government of Mr. Lumumba could have re-established order all over the territory.

It was with peaceful intentions that on the evening of July 12, accompanied by the President of the Republic, Mr. Kasavubu, the Congolese Premier left Luluabourg for a visit to Elisabethville. He wanted to evaluate on the scene the seriousness of the situation and the effectiveness of the measures that had been taken regarding the re-establishment of order.

Just when the plane was ready to land, the Minister of the Interior of the new Katangan government, Mr. Godefroid Munongo, had all the lights of the airport extinguished and had Mr. Lumumba informed that for the sake of maintaining order, he was refusing the plane permission to land. The plane, with the President and the Prime Minister on board, was forced to fly on into the night.

The next day, in a foolish statement, Commandant Weber, Chief of the Belgian Metropolitan troops operating in the Katanga, blatantly congratualted Minister Munongo "for his attitude at the airport yesterday at 9:30 P. M. on the occasion of the attempted landing of Mr. Lumumba's plane." He added, "that will enable us to safeguard order in Katanga." This time the breech was final. Belgium had been betrayed by Belgians!

PART IV

WORLD REACTION TO THE SECESSION OF THE KATANGA

THE BELGIAN ATTITUDE BEFORE THE SECESSION

We have seen that the burden of responsibility for the break between the Belgians and the Congolese did not fall upon Prime Minister Lumumba, as has often been said, but upon the rebel president of Katanga Province, Moise Tshombe.

In this respect it is hard to find words to describe how public opinion was misled by false circumstances.

In proposing to Belgium the establishment of a Belgo-Katanga community, President Tshombe was proposing nothing but the destruction of the work, in many respects praiseworthy, that Belgium had accomplished in the Congo for over eighty years. He was proposing nothing less than the complete annihilation of the great dream of Leopold II. It is remarkable and puzzling to the historian that there were so many persons in Belgium who lacked the discernment to grasp this evidence.

In fact, Belgian policy regarding the Congo during the eleven days that elapsed after the Independence of the Congo and the Katanga secession suffered from the same weaknesses and contradictions that were apparent in the unsuccessful attempt to secede at the end of June.

Thus, in the Katanga a handful of Belgian soldiers, lacking an opportunity for conquests or battles and not only content with being the accomplices of a rebel government, were indulging themselves in ill-timed and clearly subversive statements. In Leopoldville, on the other hand, Ambassador Van Den Bosch was trying his best to keep the Belgian military action within legal limits.

Thus, the very same day that the so-called Katangan government, thanks to the help of Belgian troops, prevented the landing in Elisabethville of the President and Prime Minister, the Belgian Ambassador at Leopoldville was telegraphing the Belgian Consul General in Elisabethville to arrange a meeting between Belgian Ministers De Schryver and Granhof, on one side, and the heads of the state and the Congolese government on the other side. This action not only makes it clear that the Belgian government had no direct responsibility for the serious incidents at Elisabethville

but it also shows that the Belgian government was unable to make an unleashed mob of soldiers respect its decisions. This fact is also illustrated by a telegram from Mr. Wigny, dated July 12, that is extremely enlightening as to the Belgian diplomatic position at this point.

YESTERDAY DELIVERED FOLLOWING NOTE TO DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES OF GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE, LUXEMBOURG, GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC, THE NETHERLANDS, UNITED STATES. STOP. ACTION INCREASES. KATANGA TO ESTABLISH PROVINCE AS INDEPENDENT STATE AND SEEK RECOGNITION BY FOREIGN POWERS. STOP. BELGIUM IS OPPOSED FOR SEVERAL REASONS. STOP. SHORT TERM REACTION IN REST OF CONGO WOULD BE CONSIDERABLE, ENDANGERING EUROPEAN LIVES AND POSSESSIONS BECAUSE OF FALSE ACCUSATIONS OF PARTICIPATION IN PLOT. STOP. MIDDLE OF THE ROAD EASTERN CONGO FAVORS PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. MUST STILL WORK OUT FINAL STRUCTURE. THERE WILL BE THE POSSIBILITY, AND EVEN THE NEED, TO REVIEW KATANGA RELATIONS WHEN ATMOSPHERE IS CALMER. STOP. LONG TERM SECESSION WILL JEOPARDIZE ECONOMIC VITALITY OF CONGO COMPLEX AND MAKE IT PREY TO COMMUNISM. STOP. IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT KATANGA ALONE COULD RESIST FUTURE SUBVERSION OR AGGRESSION. STOP. BELGIAN GOVERNMENT INSISTS THAT FRIENDLY POWERS AS WELL AS TSHOMBE USE DISCRETION OR AT LEAST STALL. STOP. IT IS TO BE NOTED THAT BELGIAN METROPOLITAN TROOPS ARE IN E'VILLE COMING FROM KAMINA. TROOPS ASSURING ORDER AND EFFICIENCY. WILL STAY ON THE SPOT AS LONG AS NECESSARY. ALL INTERVENTION WOULD BE USELESS AND WOULD ADD TO CHANCE OF GREATER CONFUSION.

(signed) WIGNY

This dispatch was designed to prevent certain foreign powers from recognizing the independent State of the Katanga, and this considerably weakened the international position of Moise Tshombe.

ated
ten-

C
S,
M

N.

THE BELGIAN ATTITUDE AFTER THE SECESSION

The weakness of its Congolese policy as well as its lack of firmness and coherence was to place Belgium in an unenviable diplomatic position. Only fifteen days after the proclamation of independence, Belgium's severance of diplomatic relations with The Congo, the international criticism to which Belgium was being subjected and the ever-increasing pressure of business circles caused Belgium to renounce the pursuit of the grandiose and generous policy it had limned for the Congo; remembering the importance of its material interests in Africa, Belgium resigned itself to the pursuit of a policy drawn up by a few ambitious and irresponsible army officers who soon were being hailed as heroes and innovators.

The circumstances can doubtless explain this regretful change of position, but in no sense do they justify it.

Officially, Belgium refused to intervene further in Congolese affairs. However, it declared itself ready to grant its support anywhere, if requested. Belgium must have been fully aware that by giving substantial support to Moise Tshombe it would permit the Katangan regime to assert itself and to consolidate its independence from the central government in Leopoldville. Furthermore, Belgium, by permitting the provincial governments to deal with her on a unilateral basis, accentuated the centrifugal tendencies of a country whose structure was still very fragile.

Consequently, from the first days following the proclamation of its independence, the Katanga organized itself and reinforced its position all along, mainly due to support coming for the most part from Belgium. Mr. Harold d'Aspremont-Lynden left for Elisabethville as special envoy of the Belgian Government and head of the Belgian Technical Delegation to Tshombe's government. His mission was to take every possible measure to prevent the exodus of the Belgians from the Katanga.

Major Crevecoeur went about the task of putting the "elite" Katangan gendarmerie under control; the latter were to achieve a tragic notoriety during the fighting of September, 1961.

Lastly, Col. Champion, commander of the Belgian troops in the Katanga, received full powers to draft all Belgian subjects between the ages of 20 and 45 years old.

The new Belgian policy in Katanga was very well defined in a six-point program that Mr. Wigny delivered on July 26 to Mr. Aspremont:

"1. The unity of the Congo is the achievement of Belgian toil. Any modification must be worked out by the Congolese themselves.

2. The Katanga position has Belgium's complete sympathy and the technical aid that you are providing is ample proof of this.

3. Belgium was particularly pleased by the recent statements of Mr. Tshombe where he looks upon Katanga as the nucleus of a future confederation of the Congo states. Any rallying of other provinces of the Congo to the Katanga is to be encouraged, with discretion, of course.

4. Your position must be strictly one of aid and advice. The Katanga must develop its African personality by itself and consequently decisions must be made by Katangans and not by Belgians. The Africанизing of military and civilian personnel must be achieved as soon as possible.

5. In this spirit, the following key positions should be set up as soon as possible under Katangan direction with the eventual aid of Belgian agents: First: Information and radio broadcasting

Second: Security and the police

6. It seems extremely important that the Katangan government should clarify its position regarding the chief non-communist African Governments."

Thus, Belgium set about destroying the work it had accomplished in the Congo over so many years -- and it helped dig the grave for any possibility of a renewal of negotiations with the Congolese government.

WORLD REACTION

On one essential point, the Machiavellian scheme of the Katangan rebel government was doomed to failure. Actually, Moise Tshombe was relying on the hope that the day following his treasonous act a number of countries would recognize his state and the legitimacy of his government. He seriously counted upon the immediate support of Belgium and Great Britain, whose financial interests in Katanga were particularly important.

In fact, as has been shown several times previously, the Belgian government, in the Katangese affair, was to be blamed more for its weakness than for its bad faith.

No matter how active the Belgian government's sympathy toward the rebel province, it could not completely forget the past nor could it forget its private responsibilities in the rest of the Congo, for the most part due to the presence, in spite of the trouble times, of numerous Belgian settlers.

It has been mentioned before that the note sent by Mr. Wigny, chiefly to the Government of Great Britain, was aimed at preventing a hasty recognition of Katangan independence.

There was in the Belgian attitude an element of positiveness that merits praise. Whatever else has happened since its birth until this day, no country, even those most tempted to do it for selfish reasons, was ever foolish or weak enough to offer official recognition to the independent State of the Katanga.

Even the most hermetically sealed minds, those most inclined to say that Mr. Tshombe had achieved in the whole of the Province of Katanga what is called by certain jurists, "the effective legal power in a new state", never negotiated with him except as a de facto power.

The more obviously illegal Tshombe's position became, the more obvious were the risks for a nation in recognizing the rights of "The Independent State of Katanga" since such an act would immediately be certain to provoke universal criticism.

REACTION OF THE U. N.

The Belgian Government was not the only one to act with weakness in the Katangan affair.

In this respect the U. N. itself is not above reproach.

However, the impartiality and honesty of the Late Secretary General of the U. N., Mr. Dag Hammarskjold, of illustrious memory, as well as his sincere wish to aid our country and to solve the Congolese crisis by peaceful means, cannot be doubted.

The weakness of the U. N. that became apparent in the Congo stems more from the nature of its mission than from any deliberate plot against the Republic of the Congo.

In fact, it must be stated that if the scruples of the Secretary General reflect honor on his person and disclose the high regard he had for his functions, these same scruples, however, enabled the Katangan Government to prolong its existence. This may be considered as one of the indirect causes of the present tragedy of the Katanga.

The fanatical opposition that Moise Tshombe continually evidenced to the United Nations authorities, as well as his scorn for the resolutions of the Security Council, anxious to vouchsafe the peace in the Republic of the Congo, give us a new insight into the criminal inclinations of this unhappy man.

It was on July 13, 1960, upon the request of the Secretary General, that the Security Council met for the first time to examine the situation in the Republic of the Congo. The Secretary General took this initiative after having received cabled messages from President Kasavubu and from Premier Lumumba on July 12 and 13.

As quoted from the resolution which the body adopted:

1. Appeals to the Belgian government to withdraw its troops from the territory of the Republic of the Congo.
2. Authorizes the Secretary General to take, after consultation with the Government of the Republic of the Congo, the necessary steps to provide this government with military aid until the moment when the national security forces are in a position, in the Government's opinion, to carry out their duties entirely.

Although this resolution does not deal directly with the Katangan situation, it is not hard to discover in the word "entirely" an allusion to the restoration of Congolese unity. The text of the resolution was immediately to evoke from the Belgian and Congolese governments interpretations that were both unilateral and diametrically opposed.

From the Belgian Premier Mr. Eyskens; "The sending of U. N. troops meant that these troops were destined actually to replace Belgian troops who were there in a protective capacity and only on that condition would they withdraw to their bases."

Conversely, the Congolese government deemed that it was the duty of the U. N. troops to put an immediate end to the Katangan secession. On July 30, 1960, a Congolese official invited to participate in the deliberations of the Security Council complained bitterly: "To see the forces of the U. N. stand by watching the consolidation of the Katanga secession and to see the Belgians behave there as though they were in a conquered country under the protection of a pseudo-Katangan Provincial Government that we, the true government of the Republic of the Congo, have declared deposed.

"We must note in this respect the incomprehensible delays in the deployment of the U. N. forces in the provinces occupied by Belgian troops, and mainly in Katanga where the so-called government is in open rebellion against the U. N."

This speech placed on the Secretary General the very responsibilities that he was trying to avoid. To dispose of the Belgian troops without interfering in the internal affairs of the Congo, while the Belgian troops themselves interfered with Congolese internal affairs -- that was the problem facing Mr. Hammarskjold.

More practically, the dilemma consisted in not knowing whether it was more important to safeguard, before anything else, law or order, when neither was any longer visible in the Congolese territory. However, in the resolution of July 12, 1960, the Security Council had made perfectly clear its ultimate aims, if not the necessary steps to achieve them.

"The Council:

1. Calls upon the Government of Belgium to implement speedily the Security Council Resolution of 14 July, 1960 on the withdrawal of their troops and authorizes the Secretary General to take all necessary action to this effect;
2. Requests all states to refrain from any action which might tend to impede the restoration of law and order and the exercise by the Government of Congo of its authority and also to refrain from any action which might undermine the territorial integrity and the political independence of the Republic of the Congo."

In the face of the resolute and unyielding attitude of the Congolese Government, Mr. Hammarskjold decided to swing into action. On August 2, he announced the visit to Elisabethville of his special repre-

sentative, Mr. Ralph Bunche. He was scheduled to arrive there on August 5 and the first contingent of U. N. troops in the Katanga was scheduled for August 6.

In the Katanga, Tshombe's Government and his acolytes lost control of themselves. They were absolutely determined to oppose by all possible means the execution of the resolutions of the Security Council and the entry into the Katanga of the U. N. troops. Their bellicose statements and threats placed the U. N., whose mission must remain essentially a peaceful one, in an extremely delicate position.

In a report to the Secretary General on August 5, Mr. Bunche suggested that the operation be halted. His counsel was based on four points:

- "1. The obdurate and open opposition of Moise Tshombe, his ministers and important chiefs to the arrival of the U. N. troops; their repeated statements that the Katangans would oppose with all their power the U. N. troops (the last such statement was made on August 5 at 11 o'clock); their request that you should be personally informed as to their position because it is their opinion that the U. N. will have to bear the burden of any disaster that may take place, should the U. N. troops attempt to install themselves in the Katanga.
- "2. The tangible evidence in the press of opposition to the arrival of the U. N. troops, in the calls for 'mobilization,' in the long columns of new army recruits which are marching through the streets, in the call to 'warriors' and in the possibility of an ambush in Jadotville where the U. N. forces are supposed to land.
- "3. The convincing evidence that a fanatical opposition is developing which I personally verified on the morning of August 5 at the airport, where I had difficulty trying to avoid any serious incidents.
- "4. The fact that the operations did not envisage facing real armed opposition and that any such new development in the situation would call for completely different plans if the operation were to succeed."

In view of the gravity of the situation created by President Tshombe's provocative attitude, the Secretary General once again assembled the Security Council.

The Security Council clarified the Secretary General's mission and:

"Calls upon the Government of Belgium to withdraw immediately its troops from the Province of Katanga under speedy modalities determined by the Secretary General and to assist in every possible way the implementation of the Council's resolutions;

"Declares that the entry of the United Nations force into the Province of Katanga is necessary for the full implementation of this resolution.

"Reaffirms that the United Nations force in the Congo will not be a party to or in any way intervene in or be used to influence the outcome of any internal conflict, constitutional or otherwise."

Even if this clarified the Secretary General's mission, it must be admitted that the resolution of August 8 did not facilitate it. Actually, Mr. Hammarskjold had to perform the tour de force of ordering the U. N. troops to enter into the Katanga without having them interfere in the internal affairs of the Congo.

With diabolical shrewdness, Mr. Tshombe exploited this difficulty and would only accept the landing of the U. N. troops subject to a series of conditions which, if accepted, would have put Tshombe's government under the protection of the U. N.

Conditions under which Moise Tshombe would permit the entrance of U. N. troops into the Katanga's territory

1. No communist sympathizing elements or elements systematically hostile to the Katanga in the contingent of international troops to be sent to the Katanga. Questioned on this subject, the President said that he had in mind Ghana and Guinea, among others.

2. Commitment by the U. N. not to interfere in the internal affairs of the Katanga.
3. Katanga's government, together with the U. N. force, will keep control of the routes of access to the Katanga. Only the Katangan government will have the right to admit or refuse admission to persons or merchandise.
4. The U. N. will not put its planes at the disposal of "Lumumba's emissaries".
5. The U. N. will not interfere with the system of justice and administration of the Katanga.
6. The U. N. will not oppose the reorganization of the Katangan forces which will keep their arms. The Government of Katanga will take over possession of the arms left behind by the Belgians at the Kamina after the evacuation of Belgian troops.
7. Katanga will be free to make an appeal to all foreign experts and technicians.
8. The political status quo will be maintained, based on the new Katangan Constitution. The Katanga will be free to enter into negotiations with any government of the ex-Belgian Congo, or part of it.
9. The U. N. will oppose in all the Congo the arming of political paramilitary organizations.
10. The U. N. forces of occupation will not remain inactive; they will intervene, if necessary, against troublemakers in the Congo.

Obviously, it was impossible for the Secretary General to enter into official discussions with President Tshombe on the basis of these conditions. Nevertheless, in reality the Secretary General favored most of these conditions, even the more important ones like the sixth.

Mr. Hammarskjold had fallen into the trap.

PART V

THE "INDEPENDENT STATE" OF THE KATANGA FIGHTS FOR ITS SURVIVAL

MR. TSHOMBE ENDEAVORS TO STRENGTHEN THE FOUNDATIONS OF HIS STATE

An all too frequent political phenomenon of recent years is the attempt of an illegitimate government experiencing increasing internal tensions to vindicate itself on the international level by covering up with vociferous propaganda the difficulties it is having to survive.

The fanfaronades of President Tshombe were nothing more than a cover for dictatorship, massacre, and suppression.

ON THE DOMESTIC SCENE

The presumptuous self-confidence with which Tshombe's government organized the so-called Independent State of the Katanga was astonishing.

Right from the beginning, rather like a miracle, and with an ease which would indicate that the Katangan secession was a long premeditated plan, a Constitution is born, a flag is created, and a Senate is in session. The Katanga Monitor prints its first issue, Mr. Tshombe is appointed chief of the State of the Katanga. A Katanga National Bank is established, and, to top it off, a Katangan currency is uttered.

All these actions through which Moise Tshombe hopes to have his authority acknowledged only cover him with ridicule in the eyes of the undeluded world.

ON THE FOREIGN SCENE

On the international level, Mr. Tshombe persists in his megalomania and in his fantastic ambitions. Belgium and other Western powers -- mainly Great Britain -- encourage him in his outrages.

KATANGA PROPOSES THE CREATION OF AN ANTICOMMUNIST AFRICAN FEDERATION

On July 17, 1960, in an extraordinarily bold statement, mixing absurd concepts and extravagant projects, Moise Tshombe said:

"Katanga, country of order and peace, does not want communism. If we proclaimed our independence, it was not only to escape from slavery and poverty which everywhere are the consequences of communist domination, but also to keep the people of the Katanga free in a free world. Neither my government nor myself have at any moment asked for the support or the aid of the financial and capitalistic powers nor will we ever.

"Katanga will never yield to communist domination. It does not want to remain alone in black Africa in this struggle in which it is engaged and which will continue unhesitatingly and unfailingly.

"I hereby launch an appeal to all my African brothers. OUR DREAM is to form a confederation of all free nations of Africa, to place African power on an equal political and economic footing with all other nations of the free world thereby checking communism, disrupter of all social organizations and moral standards."

This appeal to an African ideal is even more absurd when we take note that the only African leaders who responded to it were precisely those who hoped to profit from the riches of the province.

In taking this "dream" -- the word is Mr. Tshombe's -- for a reality, certain financial powers were already envisioning the constitution of a confederation grouping Kivu, Kasai, Ruanda-Urundi, and in the future possibly even the Rhodesias.

Needless to say, this confederation of theirs never had the slightest chance of realization; the anti-communist federation was stillborn.

This failure and the rebuffs received from every quarter did not diminish Moise Tshombe's bravado nor his arrogance.

MOISE TSHOMBE TRIES TO RALLY ALL CONGOLESE POLITICAL LEADERS
AROUND HIMSELF AND HIS DOCTRINE

Taking advantage of the political chaos in the rest of the Congo, Tshombe adopted an insolent and provocative attitude toward the Leopoldville authorities. His attitude was encouraged by certain African nations which became his accomplices and praised him in order to profit by it.

Thus, contrary to his promises to President Kasa-Vubu, at the Brazzaville conference called by President Youlou of the Republic of Congo (Brazzaville) on December, 1960, Moise Tshombe was received with honors usually accorded to heads of state.

It was then that Mr. Tshombe tried to expand his sphere of influence to encompass all of the Congo and to assume the leadership "of the territories that constituted the former Belgian Congo."

He declined offers of collaboration from the Ileo government because acceptance of these offers would have implied his submission to the Central Government; this Tshombe, in all his pride, refused to do. He wished, once and for all, to destroy Congolese unity.

In this frame of mind he went to Tananarive in March, 1960. His behavior at that time was not that of a prodigal son seeking re-admission into the Congo family in order to build a new Congo with his brothers; quite the contrary, he behaved as a man who refused to be contradicted, trying to extend to the entire Congo the dictatorship he had already established in his own province.

His intransigent attitude, no longer armed with the anti-communist club, clearly demonstrates his megalomania. He declared himself ready to help his Congolese brothers, but only on condition that they submit to his will.

At Coquilhatville, in May, he even went further, accusing the Leopoldville government of betraying him, and threatening to quit the conference if his ultimatum was not met.

The position of the Leopoldville authorities toward the so-called State of Katanga will be reviewed in detail in another chapter.

At this time it is sufficient to emphasize once again the enormous ambition and outrageous pretensions of Moise Tshombe and recall that

these pretensions were voiced in a violent and blatant tone intended to mask the Katanga's situation and impending disintegration.

ASPIRING TO THE LEADERSHIP OF THE CONGO
AND ALL OF CENTRAL AFRICA, MR. TSHOMBE IS NOT EVEN ABLE
TO MAINTAIN HIS AUTHORITY IN THE KATANGA PROVINCE

It must be remembered exactly how, prior to the proclamation of Congolese independence, President Tshombe seized power in the Copper Province. In the elections of May, 1960, Conakat emerged as a minority party despite the only slightly disguised support it received from the Belgian administration and despite the important financial backing it received throughout the political campaign.

In order to constitute a government, Conakat had to obtain an amendment to the Fundamental Law. To achieve this, Conakat resorted to "secession blackmail" together with a promise that the Cartel in opposition would be equitably represented in the provincial government.

As soon as the Fundamental Law was altered, Conakat suppressed the opposition and constituted a one-party government.

After the proclamation of Katangan independence, however, Mr. Tshombe realized that he ought to rally around him all the people of the province because without their support his authority would be questioned by foreign countries and his dreams of power doomed to failure.

For this reason on July 15, four days after the proclamation for Katangan independence, Moise Tshombe appealed to what he called "his countrymen":

"Fellow Countrymen:

"I must tell you of a problem of particular concern to the Katangan government. It has to do with the broadening of representation in the government in order that all parties be adequately represented.

"You should be aware that since the convocation of the Katangan Assembly, the government has made several offers to the Katangan Cartel so that it could take its seats and participate in the administration.

"The Katangan Government offers the Cartel five cabinet appointments, one of them the Vice-Presidency. Although the Cartel has accepted the government's offer on several occasions, it has, for no reason or clear motive, gone back on its word.

"I want to make clear to everyone his responsibilities. The hour is grave. It is not the time for foolish political or tribal misunderstandings. At this moment, when Katanga takes its place among the free nations, it is the duty of all of you to show your civic responsibility and your patriotism. It is through the union of all favorable forces that we can restore faith in Katanga and guarantee the country's prosperity.

"If some of you have doubts, look around you. You will see how much blood, tears, and suffering have been inflicted upon the Lower Congo and upon the other regions of the Congo where destructive forces have ruined eighty years of work and progress. Fellow countrymen, had Katanga chosen to follow that path, you would today have been reduced to poverty, hunger, and unemployment.

"I, therefore, send an urgent appeal to all political leaders of the Katanga Cartel to accept the cabinet posts that the Government is offering them. We are all brothers. We belong to the same Katangan family.

"The welfare of the population, the country's development and public order require the collaboration of all under the direction of a government in which all parties are broadly represented.

"The government asks the Katanga Cartel to face its responsibilities. Now is the time for it to do its duty for the ultimate good of our beloved Katanga."

The leaders of the Cartel were not fooled by this hypocritical statement. They still recalled the manner in which they were deceived before independence.

They also remembered their obligation to the Congolese nation. They were decided not to let themselves be bought off. They preferred loyally to serve their country rather than accept the honors offered by a rebel politician.

On July 27, before the Provincial Assembly of the Katanga, referred to by some of its members as the Katangan House of Representatives, the spokesman for the Cartel made this admirable and loyal statement:

"In the name of all of the members of the Cartel, we are astounded to note that the Katangan Government, composed of members of one party only and one that we can qualify as a puppet government, insists on proclaiming the Katanga's independence.

"This is astonishing in view of the fact that in several provincial assemblies, the Cartel's representatives have repeatedly asked the President of the Council of Ministers to submit his project for study by the Provincial Assembly and in view of the fact that at a later meeting, the Council unanimously tabled the Provincial Government's statement proclaiming the Katanga's independence.

"We do not understand why to this day, without complying with the conditions imposed by the Council, the President has on each occasion attempted to force his own position on everyone and proclaimed the Katanga independent. The Katanga will never attain peace unless the following indispensable conditions are satisfied:

"The Katanga's government must be composed of members of the two great parties, Conakat and the Cartel, but negotiations between Mr. Tshombe and Cartel members cannot bear fruit; Conakat's demands are impossible.

"The Katanga's government must consider the province as one of the provinces of a united Congo.

"The Katanga's government must immediately put a halt to the arbitrary arrest of persons and the destruction of property.

"Katanga's Government must avoid provoking any disturbances in the rural areas which will risk the complete ruination of our province.

"Katanga's government must immediately set free all Cartel members presently in jail for political reasons.

"Finally, the Katanga's government must conduct its policies in a climate of total understanding because we shall never again tolerate the dictatorial methods of certain members of the government.

"The Katanga's government must fly the Congolese flag -- six yellow stars and a large central star -- in its rightful place in all areas of our province. We do not know, accept or allow any other flag, except the above mentioned, to be flown over Katangan territory.

"Do not fight one another, let yourselves be beaten if necessary, but don't forget that truth alone triumphs at the end."

However, Moise Tshombe proceeded to drown the opposition in a blood bath, the opposition that dared raise its voice against him in the province where he ruled as absolute master.

THE SUPPRESSION LEADS TO BLOODSHED

The Baluba of the Katanga were fixed in their determination to remain faithful to the Central Government and to regain their imperiled freedom.

In the beginning of September, the Baluba opposition became more and more active. Mr. Tshombe, in order to check it, turned for help to the Katangan gendarmerie in order to keep his authority from being toppled.

This action was even more barbaric when we consider that the Baluba's only means of defense was nothing more than bows, arrows and a few obsolete rifles.

On the other hand, Moise Tshombe possessed modern weapons with which his unscrupulous foreign allies provided him.

During October and November, the Baluba activity was intensified. Every day there were bloody incidents, killings and savage suppression. Mr. Jason Sendwe recently estimated that more than 30,000 Baluba died heroically for the Congolese nation.

BELGIUM RETURNS TO A MORE SAGACIOUS POLICY

In the face of this ferocious opposition, Belgium hesitated to continue its unilateral aid and began to question whether the evil it was encouraging was not worse than the evil it was trying to avoid. Since September, 1960, Belgium had granted new financial aid to the Leopoldville authorities and it informed Katangan officials that from then on they would have to finance their "military operations" by themselves.

That was certainly a wise and considered attitude which the so-called Katangan "ultras" could not easily forgive.

On October 4, Mr. Kambola Ndala, a former member of the Central Committee of Conakat, violently attacked the former administrator.

"Everyone knows that the Katanga's independence is being sabotaged by the Belgian government and its financiers. Brussels has given us political independence but beneath this it would like to keep an economic monopoly over the Congo. Who can convince us that Belgium is in a delicate position over the question of recognizing our independence? France was in a situation as difficult as this at the time of the Mali split. Belgium is afraid. Let them quit our country. We have been the only ones to extend to them a friendly hand; Belgium did not accept. If we wish to save this country, we must offer our hand to a country from which we shall then ask for technical and financial aid."

Mr. Kambola Ndala should have made clear that he was referring to France in his statement.

Defining Conakat's position, Mr. Kambola Ndala declared that the following steps must be taken in Katanga:

1. Repatriation of all Belgian citizens who do not want to adopt Katangan citizenship.
2. Nationalization of the Union Minière du Haut Katanga and all other Belgian concerns.

3. In the Katangan administration preference should be given to French, Canadian and German technical personnel instead of to Belgian personnel.

4. Refusal to admit new Belgian settlers or Belgian capital.

MOISE TSHOMBE RESORTS TO FOREIGN MERCENARIES FOR HELP

In the face of universal criticism directed against him, and due to the hesitation of those who Mr. Tshombe believed would support his reckless policy to the very end, he had no choice but to resort to as reckless a solution as a politician could be forced to take.

Without Belgian aid to support his gendarmerie, he had to appeal to mercenaries all over the world who were willing to offer their services to any cause, even the most unjust.

These mercenaries, soon to be called "the horribles", came in time to support the Katanga in its fratricidal struggle. They were mainly French, English, Rhodesian and South African in origin.

Thus, Moise Tshombe, forgetting that he himself was a Congolese, did not hesitate to appeal personally to the worst enemies of the black man in organizing the bloody suppression of his Congolese brothers in Northern Katanga. This was by no means the least of his crimes.

PART VI

ATTEMPTS BY THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT TO END THE SECESSION OF THE KATANGA PROVINCE

The Leopoldville Government never ceased its fight for
Congo Unity

During the first year of independence, the Central Government of the Republic of the Congo faced many serious difficulties which hampered the goal of national unity. The fight for this goal was carried on in the midst of the greatest pressures, when machinery vital to the administrative and economic life of the Congo was in constant jeopardy. During this time, however, the Central Congo Government never renounced the basic mission delegated to it by the people of the Congo: the re-establishment of territorial unity of the Republic of the Congo.

A great deal of credit must be given to the President of the Republic, His Excellency, Mr. Joseph Kasa-Vubu who remained faithful to the constitutional oath he took on June 27, 1960: "I solemnly swear to enforce the laws of the Republic of the Congo and to uphold national independence and territorial unity."

As a result of events which occurred at the beginning of July 1960, and in particular the Katanga secession, an extremely serious constitutional crisis arose. The conferences that met subsequently to study the situation had one principal purpose: To settle the constitutional crisis and preserve the territorial unity of the Republic of the Congo.

The Central Government's desire to restore unity to the Congo was indicated by this conciliatory attitude it took, which led it to make some very important concessions to Katangan President Tshombe. The Central Government's goodwill and desire to settle the Congo crisis peacefully was constantly frustrated by the intransigent and fanatic extremism of Moise Tshombe.

Mr. Tshombe has continuously opposed the re-establishment of a Congo which does not conform to his personal political views. What the Katanga authorities have consistently demanded is recognition of an independent state of Katanga. Any kind of collaboration with the Central Government has always been out of the question. Mr. Evariste Kimba "Minister of Foreign Affairs" of Katanga province, in October 1960, even went so far as to submit to Mr. Bomboko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of

the Central Government, an agreement which basically aimed at the recognition of an independent Katanga. It was disguised in such expressions as "Congo and Katanga territories" and "respective governments". Mr. Bomboko, of course, refused to be trapped by this scheme.

THE TENANARIVE CONFERENCE

The famous "Round Table" of Congo leaders took place at Tananarive in March 1961.

Certain groups have at great length criticized the lack of firmness on the part of the Central Government. In all fairness, however, it must be remembered that the atmosphere of the Tananarive Conference was charged with Moise Tshombe's inflated ego and separatist ambitions. He had just been received as an official guest at Brazzaville by President Youlou and had reciprocated President Youlou's hospitality at Elisabethville. At this point, Mr. Tshombe's growing closeness with the French community countries re-enforced the Central Government's fear of a complete break-away of the Katanga Province from the Republic of the Congo.

It thus became necessary at Tananarive to get Moise Tshombe to evidence a desire to stay in the Republic of the Congo. After some time, Mr. Tshombe yielded and admitted that "the territory of the former Belgium Congo constitutes, in its entirety, a confederation of states" (Resolution 3; Article I).

In view of subsequent events, it must be pointed out here that not one of the Tananarive Conference resolutions implied recognition of an independant state of Katanga by the Central Government. Article 1 of Resolution 1, which Moise Tshombe later tried to enforce at Coquillatville, states: "The already existent states represented at the Conference are recognized..." (There are no provisions as to what is meant by a "state already in existence" or what exactly is implied by "recognition.")

Mr. Tshombe further proposed to the delegates at Tananarive the creation of certain institutions which, if they were ever established, would paralyze the political life of the Republic of the Congo. This is illustrated by Article 6 of Resolution 3 which proposed:

- a) The Council of States has responsibility for determining the Confederation's general policies on both the domestic and international levels.
- b) Resolutions must be unanimously approved by all members.

The last provision would have enabled Mr. Tshombe to carry out a new kind of blackmail -- something which he undoubtedly would not refrain from doing at the slightest opportunity.

PRESIDENT KASA-VUBU REINFORCES HIS ATTITUDE

Deeply concerned over the chaotic situation in Northern Katanga, on April 14, the Chief of State solemnly warned the president of the province of Katanga:

"In view of the deterioration of the situation in Northern Katanga, I remind you of the terms of my telegram of April 4 in which I asked you to cease military operations in the Baluba region. The resolution of the Tananarive Conference was to abstain from the use of force to solve immediate problems. Since that time, your only concern has been to obtain a military victory without negotiation. I cannot but deplore this attitude, especially since you jeopardize the Tananarive resolutions by your unilateral and warlike action. It is impossible for me to give approval to your policy. I beg you to put an end to the bloodshed caused by your military operations against our brothers. Harmonious co-existence of all people in the former Belgium Congo cannot be founded upon the violent enslavement of some. The nation is at stake. In the interest of all, I beg you to reconsider. I would also like to draw your attention to the growing displeasure of the United Nations and international opinion in face of your persistence in shunning all international cooperation. Your enemies insist that your attitude is dictated by interests foreign to Africa. World opinion and the majority of African opinion indicate increasing hostility and mistrust toward both Katanga's leaders and other leaders of the former Belgium Congo. I cannot accept, however, this disrepute as extending to the rest of the Congo.

"It is indispensable that you refrain from unilateral, non-coordinated initiative concerning United Nations or foreign powers. Under the Fundamental Law and the Tananarive resolutions, jurisdiction is given only to the Central Government in this matter. During this crucial period, I consider it essential to uphold the Fundamental Law until such time as a legal, constitutional change comes about. I ask for your urgent reply and suggest that we proceed with consultations before the present situation which appears very serious for the Katanga and perhaps the Republic of the Congo as a whole, grows any worse."

Mr. Tshombe proceeded to dismiss as superfluous the warning sent by President Kasa-Vubu. He replied:

"What you describe as 'military operations' are mere police actions by youth groups and isolated genocide in troubled areas. The people of regions economically and socially ruined appealed to the Katanga Government for the restoration of peace and normal living conditions. You have received numerous messages from all parts of Northern Katanga. The operations undertaken have been conducted in the most peaceful manner. There have been almost no human casualties in our contacts with our Baluba brothers. The facts reported to you have been distorted by unscrupulous politicians who boast fallaciously of authority over the very people they drove into disgrace and desolation by means of insidious propaganda. The sole aim of this propaganda was the gratification of personal ambitions and the perpetuation of a so-called 'international organization for peace', whose main purpose is to divide and pit us one against the other. This would then justify our being putting under a guardianship even more strict than we endured under the colonialist regime. You have already been victimized by this same set of characters. This should warn you not to trust advice and information coming from such origins."

Moise Tshombe's dishonesty again emerged into full view. It is not amusing to see the United Nations labeled by him as "the so-called international organization for peace whose main purpose is to divide us." Mr. Tshombe should be more aware than anyone else that no other body has had more concern for Congo unity. No organization has hoped more for the termination of artificial divisions created by secessionists than the United Nations.

It is with this same frame of mind that one must interpret Mr. Tshombe's allusion to "military operations consisting only of police action by youth groups in the troubled areas."

Finally, one must note Mr. Tshombe's incredible insolence in lecturing and ridiculing the Chief of State.

THE COQUILHATVILLE CONFERENCE

The majority of political leaders of the Congo (including Mr. Jason Sendwe, a political foe of Mr. Tshombe in Katanga), met in May 1961 at Coquilhatville. They first wished to clarify the resolutions made at the Tananarive Conference and secondly, amend some of the provisions contained therein that were obviously against the country's best interests.

At the opening of the Conference, Mr. Tshombe assumed a provocative attitude toward the other members of the parley. In most violent terms, he accused President Kasa-Vubu, who had just signed an agreement with United Nations on April 17, of having violated the Tananarive resolutions. Using once again his favorite weapon, blackmail, Mr. Tshombe threatened not to participate in the Conference unless some immediate satisfaction was offered him. Mr. Tshombe proposed precisely that "in order to have Katanga's participation in the conference, it would be imperative:

- 1) to give solemn notice of the termination of the agreement recently signed between President Kasa-Vubu and the United Nations regarding the enforcement of the Security Council Resolution of February 21, 1961.

This agreement openly violates the Tananarive Conference Resolution 3 which states:

- a) The Council of States has responsibility for determining the Confederation's general policies on both the domestic and international levels.
- b) The resolutions have to be unanimously approved by all Council members.

- 2) A protest must be delivered to the United Nations in view of the attack on our law-enforcing troops by Ethiopian contingents stationed at Kabalo.

- 3) The attendance at the Coquilhatville Conference must be restricted to the rightful authorities -- those who were signatories of the Tananarive resolutions."

These demands were much too absurd for consideration. Mr. Tshombe then decided to abandon the Conference. Jeopardizing this new attempt of reconciliation of the Congo leaders was not enough.

Mr. Tshombe then engaged himself in a series of outrages against public peace causing Mr. Bomboko to issue a vigorous protest on April 26:

"You may think that my mind is wandering because of what I am about to say but I do it in the name of sincerity and frankness. If I may say so, certain politicians are two-faced and are playing an ominous game.

'Mr. Tshombe's speech did not even mention the National Army. How was it possible that Mr. Tshombe allowed himself the right to engage in military expeditions of his own while at the same time accusing Mr. Kasa-Vubu of having signed an agreement concerning the disarmament of the Army and then giving this as a reason to walk out of the Conference.

"I consider this attitude as a major offense and it must be punished. If an ordinary man spread false rumors, he would be immediately arrested and punished. I would like to know why political leaders consider themselves above the rules, why do they spread rumors, mislead the people and then remain unpunished.

'I ask these questions because political leaders who receive mandates to uphold order should not be the first ones to disrupt it. If I went to Katanga and disregarded the law, Mr. Tshombe would be the first to have me arrested.

'He must surely know that we have an order that when he comes to us, he has no right to upset it. If a political leader insists on spouting demagogical speeches, we shall ask the President of the Province of the Equator to take the necessary steps to curb him."

While Mr. Bomboko was making this well-received statement, Mr. Tshombe and his entourage were trying to leave Coquilhatville by plane. This was the last straw; Mr. Tshombe was immediately arrested at the airport.

ARREST AND LIBERATION OF MOISE TSHOMBE

The episode of Mr. Tshombe's arrest created a great deal of controversy in the press. It provoked vigorous and sometimes misinformed protests, such as that of President Youlou of Congo (Brazzaville).

Some critics of the action have implied that it was a breach of the principle of "inviolability of delegates". They seem to forget, however, that the delegates themselves are obligated not to create trouble in the area to which they are sent. Mr. Tshombe has constantly stressed that he had come to Coquilhatville with constructive proposals. In fact he distributed to Conference members a draft proposal for "Organization of a Confederation of Congo States." This document contains some interesting juridical fantasies; of which a typical example is Article 44: "The Council of the States is responsible for promoting the necessary cooperation among the treasuries of the different States in order to provide monetary stability within the Confederation."

Thus, the ten or so States forming the Confederation, according to Mr. Tshombe's thinking, would each have its own currency and its own treasury. Six or so different kinds of currencies would thus be legal tender in the Republic. One can well imagine the chaos that would be created by the execution of such a plan. Those who indiscriminately praise "Mr. Tshombe's realistic and constructive spirit" are invited to study more closely his real political ideas. There is no question that they would soon change their minds.

Finally the hardships which the Katanga provincial president supposedly underwent in prison were greatly publicized in the Katanga. The slogan "He suffers for us, we must be worthy of him," was widely disseminated.

While Mr. Tshombe was being treated with great consideration by the Central Government, the Central Government, in turn, was being criticized by many - in Elisabethville especially where Tshombe was being transformed into a martyr. The news of his liberation on June 22, therefore, came as a great surprise to many.

The Central Government at this point adopted a U. N. procedure (later also adopted by Mr. Adoula) of trying to settle the Katangan problem by negotiation instead of by violence, and of not resorting to force except in extreme cases. A military agreement was signed between General Mobutu and Tshombe. Another agreement followed, this time between Mr. Tshombe and the Ileo government:

"Between the Central Government of the Republic of the Congo represented by MM. Jean Bolikango, Vice-Premier and Minister of Information; Justin Bomboko, Minister of Foreign Affairs; Marcel Lihau, Secretary of State for Justice; Pascal Nkayi, Minister of Finance; Jean-Pierre Dericoyard, Minister of Economic Planning and Coordination; Felicien Kumvayi, Minister of Labor; Jacques Massa, Minister of Social Affairs; Charles Kisolokele, Minister in charge of the Portfolio; Mario Cardoso, Delegate of the Republic of the Congo to the U. N.; A. Mahamba, Minister of Property and Lands

on one hand

AND:

MM. Moise Tshombe and Evariste Kimba, respectively President of the Government of Katanga and Minister
on the other hand,

IT WAS RESOLVED:

Art. 1: The opening of the Parliament shall take place as quickly as possible in Leopoldville. The Central Government, with the aid of the U. N., shall guarantee the safety of the members of Parliament.

Art. 2: A new Government shall be formed and presented to Parliament for a vote of confidence; this new Government shall remain in power until the adoption of the new Constitution. The adoption of the Constitution should take place within no later than three months.

Art. 3: All customs barriers between Katanga and the rest of the Congo shall be abolished. Goods coming from Katanga shall be carried by the national railway. The Central Government shall guarantee the protection of such goods.

Art. 4: Exit and entry duties will be collected at customs posts located at exit and entry points. These duties will be deposited to the Public Treasury.

Duties collected in Matadi will be deposited to the account of the Central Government at Leopoldville; duties collected in the Katanga will be deposited to the Katanga Treasury.

Art. 5: A committee of national experts to be assisted by foreign experts shall be delegated to settle disputes of autarchical societies and those with special statutes, such as CSK, CNK, INEAC, OTRACO.

Art. 6: Currency: During the transition period a single currency, but with two monetary symbols, shall be legal tender. The two monetary symbols shall eventually be replaced by one. During this period, the Katanga will be represented on the monetary council.

Art. 7: Social, Educational and Administrative Problems: On the educational level, secondary and university programs will be standardized to facilitate the conferring of academic degrees by the Central Government.

On the administrative level, all States shall be represented on a committee to be formed according to the agreement of April 17, 1961. States will submit the technical personnel, etc., to the committee for approval. This committee shall only act after taking into account the interest of the State. In case of a negative vote, the State directly concerned shall be asked to present alternate proposals.

Art. 8: Diplomatic Representation: Foreign representation is directly under the jurisdiction of the Chief of State. During the transition period, practical measures shall be enacted to prevent more than one diplomatic representation abroad.

Art. 9: Baluba Problem: The Katanga government shall effect an immediate and unconditional liberation of all political prisoners. A committee of inquiry, assisted by representatives of the two parties, will be organized by the Central Government. The President of the Katanga Government hereby agrees to meet with Mr. Sendwe outside Leopoldville in the presence of the committee of inquiry.

Art. 10: Military Problems: The two delegations shall abide by the agreements signed between the Congo National Army Headquarters and the Katangan authorities. These agreements shall be enforced immediately.

Art. 11: The two parties shall take oaths to engage themselves in the observance of these agreements.

Leopoldville, the 24th of June, 1961

Katangese Delegation: (s) Mr. E. Kimba, Minister, Mr. Moise Tshombe, President of the Government.

Delegation of the Central Government: (s) Messieurs Jean Bolikango, Justin Bomboko, Marcel Lihau, Pascal Nkay, J. P. Dericoyard, Alois Kabangi, Jacques Massa, Felicien Kimvay, Charles Kisolokela, J. Mahamba.

Immediately after his return to Elisabethville, however, President Tshombe proceeded to minimize the importance of these agreements. He acknowledged having signed them but he denied that there was any government in Leopoldville which could carry them out. Mr. Tshombe evidently possesses a very peculiar sense of honor.

Apparently some critics believed that these agreements were reached at gun point. The truth is that these very same terms were agreed upon during the Milan negotiations between Katanga envoys and Central Government delegates.

Moreover, Moise Tshombe attempted to turn General Mobutu against the Central Government. In a press conference held in Elisabethville on June 26, the Katanga president said: "Central Government ministers never agree with one another. Bolikango makes a decision, Adoula another, Bomboko defends a different thesis and Ileo a fourth point of view. If there were four Mobutus in Leopoldville, we could understand each other. I am afraid that the U. N. will not accomplish its mission because our greatest problem is the lack of a leader. I cannot understand how Mr. Ileo can speak in the name of the Central Government. As far as I know, he has not been elected by the representatives."

This last statement deserves to be remembered. With his usual insolence, Mr. Tshombe denies to Mr. Iléo the position of "authorized spokesman for the government." Mr. Tshombe thus has fallen into his own trap. A legal government has been formed in Leopoldville and Mr. Tshombe remains adamant in not recognizing it. His game is quite obvious. Proof of his duplicity and dishonesty need not be cited further.

General Mobutu himself, who played a direct and active role in the liberation of Mr. Tshombe, was soon to learn that the Katanga Provincial President is not a man to be trusted. On August 1, 1960 at Lovanium, General Mobutu succeeded in putting an end to the Congo political crisis. Mr. Tshombe, in Brazzaville at the time, expressed his wish to come to Leopoldville at 4 P.M. that afternoon. General Mobutu went to the beach to meet him; Mr. Tshombe did not arrive. Overcoming his personal feelings and determined not to overlook anything that could help national reconciliation, General Mobutu crossed the river to Brazzaville. Mr. Tshombe in return refused to see him -- the very man who had liberated him a few weeks before.

The great understanding and patience that the Central Government has always offered Tshombe has always been met with insolence, duplicity and dishonesty.

Apparently the only language that Moïse Tshombe ever understands is the language of force.

PART VII

DECISION OF THE ADOULA GOVERNMENT TO PUT AN END TO THE KATANGAN SECESSION

Since the formation of the Central Government, His Excellency Mr. Cyrille Adoula, Premier of the Congo Republic, expressed in a moderate but firm tone his desire for the immediate end of the Katanga secession.

In his inaugural speech, on August 2, 1961, Mr. Adoula devoted two particularly important sections to the Katanga situation. The first section emphasizes his wish to uphold national unity and to preserve a spirit of brotherhood among all the inhabitant of the Republic of the Congo:

"Gentlemen, the principle of the Congo National Unity does not mean the privation of other regions of the fair income earned by the exploitation of their own resources. It is possible, within the governmental structure we are about to create, to devise formulas for the division of income, therein acknowledging and giving each province or State its right to a fair share of the income of all regions of the country. If we insist that our brothers in Katanga, and I emphasize the word brothers, remain in union with us, it is not for selfish motives. Even if Katanga were nothing but an arid and barren tract of land, we would still consider it as an integral part of our country. We cannot betray our country nor those who dedicated their lives to progress for all regions of our territory."

In the second and closing section the Premier expressed his desire to put an immediate end to the Katanga secession.

"I would like to return once again to our most urgent problem: the Katanga.

"Katanga's secession has greatly harmed the country. It was the Katanga which divided us, it was the Katanga which deprived the State of a great share of the sources of revenue that belong to it.

"For a year now, we have tried all peaceful means to reach an agreement with Elisabethville. All have been in vain. Three months ago, in Coquilhatville, President Moise Tshombe's

provocations aroused the indignation of the Congo people. It was necessary to arrest this troublemaker to make him aware of the will of the Congo people and the respect due the Chief of State. Since Mr. Tshombe gave the impression of becoming more amenable, he was trusted for the last time and was sent free. Certain elements in the Katanga, however, do not desire to rejoin the Congo Community. The Brazzaville comedy is ample proof of this. The Congo people, on the other hand, want to safeguard the heritage of June 30, 1960. Neither Tshombe nor his Ministers nor the Union Minière, nor the Belgians behind the Katanga secession will succeed in preventing the Congo people from reaching their goal.

"Brothers, let us unite, let us form one single bloc. Put all your trust in your government and grant it the necessary powers to curb the Katanga secession."

At this point Mr. Tshombe's attitude toward the Central Government was extremely dubious as he sent his emissaries to Leopoldville, at the same time that he sent "Vice-President of the Council" Mr. Kibwe as well as "Minister of Public Works" Mr. Kitenge on a very suspicious trip to Rhodesia and South Africa.

On August 9, in a South African broadcast, Mr. Kibwe announced:

"We came to South Africa to study with government officials the possibilities of economic cooperation between the Katanga and the Union."

Much has happened since Mr. Tshombe was loudly proclaiming that he would never accept support from African countries in which racial segregation prevailed.

Mr. Cyrille Adoula remained determined to have the Congo's legal position recognized, which had been ignored for so many months. Mr. Adoula held a press conference in Leopoldville on August 7, in which he emphasized once again the position of his government on the Katanga problem.

"Mr. Tshombe must unconditionally rejoin the Congo. If he does not unconditionally abandon the idea of secession, we shall be obliged to resort to force. Mr. Tshombe has asked to meet me. He has asked the U. N. to guarantee his safety. I have

replied to the U. N. that Tshombe is welcome and furthermore I shall assure his safety with supplementary protection. But Tshombe need not come as a negotiator because I have nothing to negotiate with him. If he comes, I want to hear from him: 'Katanga returns to its place within the Republic of the Congo.' The Congo crisis was solved at Lovanium. Mr. Tshombe did not take advantage of the occasion to state his own point of view and therefore he has no further conditions to demand."

Mr. Adoula also pointed out that he was determined to settle the Katanga problem immediately and that he would, if necessary, make use of his own armed forces. Only as a last resort would he appeal to the U. N. for troops.

This press conference indicated very well the Premier's desire to make full use of the legality of his mandate. On one hand, he wished to settle the conflict with Mr. Tshombe in a conciliatory spirit. At the same time, he refused to negotiate on an equal footing with a mere provincial president and did not accept Tshombe's claim to any unique title. Moreover, he was ready to resort to force to enforce the Government's legal claim.

The Katanga president, with some obvious dishonesty, interpreted the Premier's statement in such a manner as to render impossible all negotiations. He replied that he would be willing to negotiate but not under threat.

This deliberate misinterpretation of the Premier's desire to see Mr. Tshombe return to the road of legality; this deliberate persistence in maintaining a rebellious attitude represented an attempt by him to force the Congo Premier to resort to force after all other efforts proved fruitless.

On August 4, a U. N. spokesman announced: "As in the past, the U. N. refuses to provide the Congo with and international means to aid it in the eventual suppression of the Katanga's attempt to secede."

The equivocation of the Katangan position became increasingly apparent in Mr. Tshombe's several statements during August. This position could be defined in this way: The Katanga is ready to collaborate with the Leopoldville government but refuses to recognize its legal mandate. On August 7, a spokesman for Mr. Tshombe said:

"The Katanga insists that the act of sending its representatives to the Parliament now in session in Leopoldville is in no way a retreat from its present position, nor is it an abandonment of its acquired rights. It is merely a friendly gesture of reconciliation toward its Congo brothers."

There is a lack of logic in this statement. It affirms the Katanga's desire to reconcile its differences with its Congolese brothers while at the same time it says that the Katanga does not respect the authority of the legitimate government of the Republic of the Congo.

On August 14, Premier Adoula made another accommodation to Elisabethville. He invited President Tshombe to participate in a conference in Leopoldville along with other provincial presidents. The text of the Premier's telegram read:

"I am organizing from Thursday 17 on, a conference rallying all the presidents of the Provincial Governments.
STOP. I invite you to come to Leopoldville in the company of your Minister of Internal Affairs and Economic Affairs.
STOP. Telegraph giving exact date your arrival. STOP."

Provincial President Tshombe replied in the following words:

"Thank you for your invitation but I restate my desire to see discussions opened between your delegates and mine before any other steps are taken. Best regards."

Later Mr. Tshombe justified his refusal to come to Leopoldville by alleging that he had not been officially invited. As the evidence is presented above, no further comment is necessary.

On August 23, in a speech delivered at Albertville, President Tshombe reassured his favorite thesis and again explained his position toward the legal government. This speech is further evidence of Mr. Tshombe's obstinate refusal to recognize his real position relative to Mr. Adoula's Central Government.

"I have said many times now that Katanga is willing to cooperate with other regions of the Congo. Our actions have confirmed our words. I went to Tananarive to participate in parleys aiming at putting an end to our differences of opinion. In the same frame of mind, I went to Coquilhatville, and the fate that awaited me there is well known to all of you.

"Our representatives are at present participating in the legislative session in Leopoldville to offer proof of the Katanga's sincere wish to arrive at a solution for the Congo problem. We think, however, that we must find a realistic solution -- one that takes into account the confederative tendencies of the country, the ill-starred experiment of a false unitary state, the failure of structures not adapted to local needs the legitimate aspirations of the people to dispose of their resources through equitable distribution. I have already declared that the Katanga's economic structure favored the association of the various regions of the Congo. I know that African solidarity calls for our collaboration with our Congo brothers, but experience has taught us that it was impossible to decide, regulate and legislate on all matters from Leopoldville. This is why I became convinced that the only valid formula is granting a large degree of political autonomy to the States of the Federation. It is moreover our duty to safeguard the results of our administration. Our desire to collaborate must be firmly guaranteed by the Central Government."

Tired of the duplicity and incomprehensibility of the Katanga Government, Premier Adoula stiffened his attitude. On August 28, he broadcast the following statement:

"Fellow countrymen:

"The government that I have the honor to represent since its first hours of existence has faced grave problems which demand rapid solutions. Among these problems is the thorny question of the Katanga secession. The government is aware of the magnitude of this problem, has explained its views on it, and has pointed out the means by which it can be solved.

"The methods under consideration do not exclude peaceful means. The government would, in fact, prefer the use of peaceful means in the Katanga affair. The only condition would be that the leaders of that province understand that such a peaceful solution is recommended in the general interest.

"The Katanga's reintegration in the Republic must be unconditionally fulfilled before discussion on questions common to all regions of the country can be undertaken. Katanga leaders who pass for champions of federalism, confederalism and internal self-determination should always bear in mind that other Congo leaders still have legitimate claims to resonant titles. Other leaders, however, understand that democracy's strength lies in a fair game of politics conducted within the limits of law. They have chosen to abide by the laws that guide our political life. Katanga leaders have usurped the law and proclaimed the secession of the Katanga as the solution to the Congo problem.

"Nearly a month has elapsed since my government took office. Throughout this period, Mr. Tshombe did not cease to repeat that he wished to meet with me. I invited Mr. Tshombe, in the company of his Minister of Internal and Economic Affairs, to Leopoldville to insure the Katanga's participation in the conference of provincial authorities that is to take place in a few days. Despite my assurances, as well as the audience such a gathering would offer, the Katanga's provincial authorities did not find it necessary to reply to my invitation. Can we believe that Mr. Tshombe will discover too late the legitimate interests of the people of his province? We hope that this will not be the case.

"Moreover, we believe that the African solution demanded by Mr. Tshombe can only be a Congo solution. And this solution cannot be worked out except through the present political institutions and through the reorganization of the country's basic structures.

"The Katanga's authorities must define and explain to Parliament what they mean by 'acquired rights.' There is no better interlocuter than a country's Parliament.

"The hour of equivocation is over. The government cannot evaluate a secessionist policy while discussing a problem the only solution of which is the unconditional reintegration of the same secessionist province.

"Fellow countrymen, this is the attitude of the Central Government vis-a-vis the Katangan problem. This policy will be followed and implemented by all means -- peaceful or otherwise."

A few days before, on August 24, the Chief of State, Mr. Joseph Kasa-Vubu, signed an ordinance countersigned by the Premier, Mr. Adoula; the Minister of Internal Affairs, Mr. Gbenye; and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Bomboko. This ordinance demanded the immediate ouster of all non-Congolese officers in the Katanga gendarmerie. At the same time, the Congo government asked the U. N. to enforce this ordinance which conformed to the resolution of February 21. The U. N. accepted the responsibility and proceeded to act immediately.

At the end of August and the beginning of September, events started to move faster. Mr. Tshombe yielded before the U. N. decision and approximately a hundred mercenaries were expelled from Katanga. Meanwhile tension mounted in Elisabethville; the people faithful to President Tshombe considered the U. N. action as treason. Relations between the Katanga gendarmerie and the U. N. blue helmets became extremely tense. On September 1, the U. N.'s representative in Katanga, Mr. O'Brien, exposed a terrorist plot against the U. N. engineered by the Katanga Government.

During the first days of September, Mr. O'Brien multiplied his appeals to President Tshombe to go to Leopoldville. These received no response.

On September 12 in a broadcast over the national radio network, the Premier announced to the nation the imminence of a recourse to force to put an end to secession in Katanga:

"If we must, we are ready to use all legal forces at our disposal to assure the reintegration of Katanga in the Republic of the Congo.

"We have hesitated for a long time -- in a desire to avoid bloodshed -- to use force to achieve this end. In the life of every nation, however, there comes a moment when hesitations are no longer admissible and there must be a move forward to achieve the supreme goals of the nation.

"We are approaching that moment; I am convinced that Mr. Tshombe, aware of his responsibilities, will not force



us to take these last drastic steps, and will instead accept the brotherly hand which we extend to him -- for the happiness of our Katangan brothers and for the well-being of all Congolese."

On the morning of September 13, the first skirmishes took place in Elisabethville between U. N. troops and the Katangan gendarmerie. The international forces acted to enforce the Security Council's resolution of February 21. The blood of our Congo brothers began to flow in Elisabethville.

The borrower must return this item on or before the last date stamped below. If another user places a recall for this item, the borrower will be notified of the need for an earlier return.

Non-receipt of overdue notices does not exempt the borrower from overdue fines.

Harvard College Widener Library
Cambridge, MA 02138 617-495-2413



Please handle with care.
Thank you for helping to preserve
library collections at Harvard.

CONCLUSIONS

To conclude this presentation, let us summarize the main points: The entire responsibility for the prolongation of the Congo crisis that led to the bloody events of mid-September rests with President Tshombe and his Katangan ministers:

1. Since its creation, Conakat, Provincial President Tshombe's party, has not disguised its desire for the secession of the province. It has been encouraged by certain Europeans who have no regard for the interests of the Congo. Their motivation is obviously selfish. At this point anti-communism does not serve as yet as a pretext.
2. Twice before independence, Conakat tried to push through the secession of the Katanga Province.
3. Through a series of maneuvers aided by accomplices in the colonial administration and in certain Belgian political circles, Conakat succeeded in modifying in its favor the Fundamental Law on which the Republic of the Congo is based.
4. Although the Conakat party was in the minority after the provincial elections, it renounced its official duties and promises, and established an unrepresentative provincial government which disregarded others' rights.
5. Eleven days after the Congo's declaration of independence, "President" Tshombe, under the pretext of a communist threat, seized the opportunity to carry out a personal dream and proclaimed Katanga independent of the Republic of the Congo.
6. Although a political campaign of great scope was conducted to obtain international recognition of his State, Mr. Tshombe was unable to enforce his authority over the entire Katanga Province.
7. Mr. Tshombe refused to accept the logical consequences of the diplomatic isolation in which he found himself.
8. In order to check what he called "the rebellion" in Northern Katanga, he resorted to violent and suppressive means.

9. Mr. Tshombe repeatedly obstructed the full enforcement of the Security Council's resolutions on the Congo.

10. When the Belgian government refused to give him unilateral aid, Mr. Tshombe appealed to the vile militancy of foreign mercenaries.

11. Mr. Tshombe, the man who, it is said, is anxious to develop an anti-communist African doctrine, does not hesitate to call for help from the Rhodesians and the South Africans, well-known enemies of the black man's freedom.

12. In his relations with Leopoldville's authorities, Mr. Tshombe refuses to admit the illegality of his position. He consistently adopts an insolent attitude and feels it is his right to dictate law to the rest of the Congo.

13. Mr. Tshombe refuses to recognize the perfect legality of Mr. Adoula's government -- a government elected unanimously by the Congo Parliament.

14. All offers made by the Central Government to settle the Katanga problem peacefully were refused by Mr. Tshombe.

These conclusions amply show that throughout the Katanga crisis, the Congolese Central Government acted within the limits of law and logic. Moise Tshombe, by a long series of provocative actions, finally exhausted the patience of the Congolese Government and forced blood to be spilt.

Mr. Tshombe carries the heavy burden of responsibility for the tragic events of September. He will have to defend himself before Africa and before History.

In spite of a deep aversion to the use of violence, the Government of the Republic of the Congo will not hesitate to use force to uphold this fundamental rights of its citizens. The Republic of the Congo hopes that Katangan leaders will demonstrate a true patriotism, and it hopes that in the future they will come to Parliament to defend their legitimate interests. Only in this manner will it be possible to achieve the unity that is indispensable to the progress and prosperity of our great country.